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INTRODUCTION 
It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters in a 
tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any suspi­
cious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no vio­
lence or threats of it. 
- Justice Jackson1 
1. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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274 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:273 
One afternoon, a police officer spots a man driving a Cadillac 
through a run·down neighborhood.2 His interest piqued, the officer 
decides to follow the vehicle. The Cadillac soon comes to rest in front 
of an apartment building, and the driver, Jimmy Barrios·Moriera, re· 
moves a shopping bag from the trunk and enters the building. The 
moment Barrios·Moriera disappears within the doorway, the officer 
sprints after him because he knows that the door to the apartment 
building will automatically lock when it closes. He manages to catch 
the door just in time and rushes in. Barrios·Moriera is already halfway 
up a flight of stairs in the common hallway and ignores the police offi· 
cer when he identifies himself and indicates a desire to speak with him. 
Barrios·Moriera continues up the stairs and sets his shopping bag on 
the floor beside him as he hurriedly tries to open his door. The police 
officer sprints up the stairs after him and arrives before Barrios· 
Moriera can do so. He thrusts his hand into Barrios·Moriera's bag and 
withdraws a rectangular·shaped object wrapped in tape. He then or· 
ders Barrios·Moriera to go into his apartment, where he arrests him 
for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. 
If this story unfolded in the Second, Seventh, Eighth, or Ninth 
Circuits, Barrios·Moriera would have no constitutional basis for com· 
plaint.3 Each of these circuits refuses to recognize that a tenant has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy within the locked common areas of 
an apartment building for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.4 The 
Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, stands alone5 in maintaining that a 
2. These facts are essentially those recounted by the court in United States v. Barrios­
Moriera, 872 F.2d 12, 13-14 (2d Cir. 1989). 
3. This story did, in fact, unfold in the Second Circuit, and Barrios-Moriera's constitu­
tional claims were summarily rejected. Id. at 14-15. 
4. See United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Concepcion, 
942 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1977). "For purposes of the Fourth Amendment" is a 
widely used expression in Fourth Amendment cases. See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 
266, 271 (1994); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984). 
5. The First, Third, Fourth, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits have not addressed the 
precise question raised in this Note. Many circuits have, however, addressed the question of 
whether a tenant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in unlocked common areas within 
an apartment complex. The First Circuit holds that there is no Fourth Amendment privacy 
interest in unlocked common areas. See United States v. Hawkins, 139 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 
1998) ("It is now beyond cavil in this circuit that a tenant Jacks a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the common areas of an apartment building.") (citing United States v. Cruz 
Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 557-58 (1st Cir. 1976) (holding, in a case of first impression, that the 
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when agents entered the apartment 
building's garage without a warrant, because defendant had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the garage)); United States v. Thomley, 707 F.2d 622, 625 (1st Cir. 1983) {holding 
that defendant, who was not a tenant of the searched apartment, had no Fourth Amendment 
claim regarding the search of an unlocked shared storage area, because defendant had no 
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy). The Third Circuit interprets the Fourth 
Amendment in this manner as well. See United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1252 (3d Cir. 
1992) (holding that a tenant's zone of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment does not 
extend to the unlocked, common hallways of apartment buildings) (citing Holland, 755 F.2d 
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tenant does have a constitutionally protected right to privacy in such 
areas.6 This circuit split first arose in 1976,7 and the issue remains very 
much in dispute today.8 As the weight of precedent on each side of the 
divide continues to grow, there is an increasing need for the Supreme 
Court to resolve this important Fourth Amendment issue. 
The Fourth Amendment protects persons against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.9 This protection of privacy embodied within the 
Amendment is not limited to the home or other specified locales;10 
rather, it is aimed at the protection of the individual.11 The Supreme 
Court interprets this protection broadly, so that "[w]herever a man 
may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreason-
253; United States v. Dickens, 695 F.2d 765, 777 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding, without citing any 
authority, that a stairwell is a public place, and holding that there can be no reasonable ex­
pectation of privacy within such areas); United States v. Breland, 715 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D.D.C. 
1989) (holding that defendant's claim to a protected privacy interest in a basement storage 
area was undermined by the unlocked door guarding the area)). Similarly, the Fifth Circuit 
does not interpret the Fourth Amendment to protect unlocked common areas. See United 
States v. Clark, 67 F.3d 1154, 1162 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that there can be no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in an exterior breezeway of an apartment building that is "neither 
enclosed nor locked"); United States v. Shima, 545 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1977) (distinguishing 
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), on the basis that the common area in 
McDonald was both enclosed and locked while the exterior walkway in this case was avail­
able to the general public). The D.C. Circuit has adopted this view as well. See United States 
v. Anderson, 533 F.2d 1210, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that "appellant's constitutionally 
protected privacy interest began at the door to [his) room [in his boarding house) . . .  rather 
than at the door to the [unlocked common areas of the] entire rooming house"); Perkins v. 
United States, 432 F.2d 612 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (embracing the district court's holding that offi­
cers' peaceable, yet warrantless, entry into the unlocked, relatively public, common hallways 
of a row house in which the defendant rented a room did not violate defendant's privacy in­
terests). 
6. See, e.g., United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976). 
7. In 1976, the Sixth Circuit handed down Carriger, which held that a tenant has a rea­
sonable expectation of privacy in the locked common areas of an apartment building. This 
holding stood in conflict with the Second Circuit's holdings in United States v. Miguel, 340 
F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1965) and United States v. Conti, 361F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1976). See also infra 
notes 45-48 and accompanying text. The split immediately deepened with the Eighth 
Circuit's decision in United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1977) holding that a tenant 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the locked common areas of an apartment 
building. 
8. See United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2001) (reaffirming the Sixth 
Circuit's original holding on this matter). 
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un­
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
10. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8 (1977). Contra United States v. 
Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1985) (suggesting that the privacy protections of the 
Fourth Amendment are inapplicable to locked common hallways because they are not part 
of the home). 
11. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment pro­
tects people, not places."). 
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able searches and seizures."12 This protection of the person extends to 
the guilty and the innocent alike,'3 but the question that remains is 
precisely what degree of protection the Fourth Amendment affords. 
The answer to this question is found by an application of what has 
come to be known as the Katz test.14 Justice Harlan first articulated 
this test in his concurring opinion in Katz v. United States,15 where he 
stated, "there is a twofold requirement [for Fourth Amendment pro­
tection], first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) ex­
pectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that so­
ciety is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "16 In Katz, the Court 
held that the FBI's use of an electronic listening device attached to the 
outside of a telephone booth violated the defendant's Fourth 
Amendment privacy rights.17 In so holding, the Court abandoned the 
traditional "trespass" doctrine upon which prior Fourth Amendment 
questions had tumed.18 
The Supreme Court subsequently adopted and refined Justice 
Harlan's standard as the binding test in Fourth Amendment cases.19 
Consequently, in every Fourth Amendment case, the Court first seeks 
to determine whether a person had, or should have had, an actual 
12. Id. at 359. 
13. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948). 
14. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) ("Since Katz . . . the 
touchstone of [Fourth] Amendment analysis has been the question whether a person has a 
'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.' "). 
15. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
16. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
17. Id. at 358-59. 
18. Id. at 353 (abandoning the "trespass" doctrine). The trespass doctrine was based on 
the premise that property interests controlled the Government's right to search and seize. 
Under this doctrine, a physical invasion into a protected area was required before a Fourth 
Amendment violation could be established See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 
134-36 (1942); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457 (1928). 
19. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000) ("First, we ask whether the indi­
vidual, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy; that is, whether he has 
shown that he sought to preserve something as private . . .. Second, we inquire whether the 
individual's expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as reason­
able.'') (internal citations and quotations omitted); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 
(1986) ("The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a 'constitu­
tionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.' ") (citing Karz, 389 U.S. at 516 (Harlan 
J., concurring)); Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176-77; Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 743 (1979); 
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 747-54 (1971). 
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subjective expectation of privacy.20 The Court will then consider 
whether that expectation was reasonable under the circumstances.21 
This Note contends that the police practice of entering the locked 
common areas of apartment buildings without permission or a warrant 
violates the Constitution. Part I examines the conflicting approaches 
adopted by the circuit courts in this area and argues that the approach 
adopted by the majority of circuits is flawed.22 Part II argues that in­
terpreting the Fourth Amendment to protect tenants' privacy expecta­
tions within the locked common areas of their apartment buildings is 
most consistent with Supreme Court precedent in other Fourth 
Amendment cases. Part III argues that this broad interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment is necessitated by the history of that Amendment 
and by the intent of the Framers. Part IV argues that a consideration 
of tenants' legitimate privacy interests, coupled with a respect for the 
rule of law, demands that the Court extend the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment to cover the locked common areas of multi-unit 
apartment buildings. This Note concludes that the Supreme Court 
should resolve this circuit split, which threatens the privacy and secu­
rity of a large portion of the American population, by extending 
Fourth Amendment protection in the locked common area context. 
I. EXAMINING CIRCUIT CA S E  LA W  
This Part critiques the conflicting approaches adopted by  the cir­
cuit courts in the locked common area context and argues that the 
Sixth Circuit's approach is superior to that adopted by the majority of 
circuits. Section I.A argues that the Sixth Circuit's analysis represents 
a well-reasoned approach to the issue and provides a solid starting 
point for the Supreme Court's resolution of this Fourth Amendment 
issue. Section LB argues that the Supreme Court should reject the po­
sition adopted by the majority of circuits because it is lacking in per­
suasive authority and meaningful analysis. 
20. See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 742-43; id. at 741 n.5 (noting that a lack of actual subjec­
tive expectation is not determinative of the case where one should have an expectation of 
privacy in a certain area); id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("(W]hether privacy expecta­
tions are legitimate within the meaning of Katz depends not on the risks an individual can be 
presumed to accept . . .  but on the risks he should be forced to assume in a free and open 
society."). 
21. See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 740; White, 401 U.S. at 752 (determining whether the de­
fendant's expectation was "justifiable," "reasonable," or "legitimate"). 
22. "A majority of circuits," as used in this Note, means a majority of the circuits that 
have addressed the question examined by this Note (that is, the Second, Seventh, Eighth, 
and Ninth Circuits). 
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A. The Sixth Circuit Provides a Sound Starting Point 
The Sixth Circuit's approach in locked common area cases estab­
lishes a firm foundation for the Supreme Court's resolution of this im­
portant constitutional issue. The Sixth Circuit takes a well-reasoned 
approach in these cases, relying on Supreme Court precedent and 
carefully considering the subjective expectations of tenants. In United 
States v. Carriger,23 the Sixth Circuit first considered whether a gov­
ernment agent's entry, without permission or a warrant, into the 
locked common areas of an apartment building violated a tenant's 
Fourth Amendment rights.24 In holding that such entry violated the 
defendant's rights, the court took a number of factors into considera­
tion. First, it noted that Katz expanded the scope of protection offered 
by the Fourth Amendment.25 Second, it took great care to analyze the 
facts and holding of United States v. McDonald26 and compare them to 
the case at hand. In McDonald, the Supreme Court held that police 
officers' warrantless entry into the locked common areas of a rooming 
house violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.27 The Sixth 
Circuit adopted Justice Jackson's explanation of the Court's holding 
and concluded that, as the facts of McDonald and Carriger differed 
only in degree but not in kind, McDonald should govern the contro­
versy before the court.28 The Sixth Circuit noted that although gov­
ernment entry in Carriger was effected through guile, whereas in 
McDonald it was by force, this distinction in no way altered the ten­
ant's subjective expectation of privacy and was therefore irrelevant to 
the court's Fourth Amendment analysis.29 Finally, the court cited a 
Louisiana Supreme Court case,30 a Fifth Circuit case,31 and two 
23. 541F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976). 
24. Carriger, 541 F.2d at 547 (holding "that because the officer did not have probable 
cause to arrest appellant or his accomplice before he invaded an area where appellant had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy [the Jocked common hallway of the apartment building], 
the subsequent arrest and seizure of narcotics were invalid"). 
25. Id. at 549 (noting that the "Supreme Court's determination that the 'trespass' doc­
trine could 'no longer be regarded as controlling' was intended to expand the protection af­
forded by the Fourth Amendment"). 
26. 335 U.S. 451 (1948);see infra Section II.A (discussing McDonald). 
27. McDonald, 335 U.S. at 455-56. 
28. Carriger, 541 F.2d at 550. 
29. Id. at 551. 
30. State v. Di Bartolo, 276 So. 2d 291, 294 (La. 1973) (recognizing a tenant's Fourth 
Amendment "right to reasonably expect privacy from government intrusion" within the 
hallways of his apartment building). 
31. Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480, 484 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that "the backyard 
area of Fixel 's [apartment) home is sufficiently removed and private in character that he 
could reasonably expect privacy . . .. Thus ... [the officer's] actual invasion into this pro­
tected area . .. violates the Fourth Amendment") (internal citation omitted). 
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Seventh Circuit cases32 that were closely on point, concluding that 
these cases, taken together with Katz and McDonald, demanded a 
holding in favor of the defendant.33 That is, the court held that a tenant 
does have a constitutionally protected privacy interest within the 
locked common areas of an apartment building, and an officer's entry 
into these areas without permission or a warrant violates the Fourth 
Amendment.34 The Sixth Circuit subsequently reaffirmed this holding, 
stating that "any entry into a locked apartment building without per­
mission, exigency or a warrant is prohibited [by the Fourth 
Amendment]."35 
The Sixth Circuit's treatment of this issue represents a well­
reasoned approach to the question of whether tenants have a constitu­
tionally protected privacy interest within the locked common areas of 
their apartment buildings. Its jurisprudence in this area, however, is 
but a starting point for the resolution of this important constitutional 
question. A thorough evaluation of this issue should articulate why the 
Sixth Circuit's approach is superior to that taken by the other four cir­
cuits that have examined the locked common area question.36 
Furthermore, a thorough evaluation must consider what role Supreme 
Court precedent,37 the history of the Fourth Amendment and the in­
tent of the Framers,38 and the demands of public policy should play in 
this process.39 
32. See United States v. Case, 435 F.2d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1970) (finding a constitution­
ally protected expectation of privacy in the locked common hallway of a commercial build­
ing); United States v. Rosenberg, 416 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1969) (finding a constitutionally pro­
tected expectation of privacy in the unlocked but closed basement of a commercial building); 
see also infra notes 88-96 and accompanying text. 
33. Carriger, 541 F.2d at 552. 
34. Id. at 550. 
35. United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 534 (6th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. 
Taylor, 248 F.3d 506 (6th Cir. 2001) (delimiting Carriger by holding that there is no Fourth 
Amendment violation where police gain entry to the locked common areas through the invi­
tation of another tenant); United States v. King, 227 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the unlocked basement of his duplex, 
due, in large part, to "[t]he nature of the living arrangement in a duplex, as opposed to a 
multi-unit building . . .  "). United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392 (6th Cir. 1994) (declining to ex­
tend the recognized reasonable expectation of privacy to an apartment building's parking 
lot). But see United States v. Smith, 941 F.2d 1210, 1991 WL 158699, at *7 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(unpublished) ("Although this Court has recognized the principfo that tenants of an apart­
ment building have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of the building 
not open to the general public, the law is not well settled in this area.") (internal citations 
omitted). 
36. See infra Section l.B. 
37. See infra Part II. 
38. See infra Part Ill. 
39. See infra Part IV. 
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B. The Majority Approach Is Unpersuasive and Should Be Rejected 
This Section criticizes the methodologies and holdings of the ma­
jority of circuits in locked common area cases and concludes that the 
Supreme Court should not adopt the position taken by these courts. 
The majority position is embodied within a long line of cases that 
stand for the proposition that a tenant has no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the locked common areas of an apartment building.40 
Quantity of cases alone, however, is not enough to establish sound le­
gal precedent, and all of these cases can be traced back to courts' un­
supported conclusions or citation to inapposite cases.41 The analysis in 
these cases does not reflect an effort to establish a consistent test to 
measure the extent and type of privacy expectations possessed by ten­
ants,42 and a meaningful application of the two-part Katz test is 
strangely absent.43 Moreover, with two puzzling exceptions,44 the ma­
jority of circuits entirely ignore McDonald. Each circuit's faulty analy­
sis will be examined in turn. 
1. The Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit's analysis fails for three reasons. First, the 
court relies upon unsupported conclusions and citation to inapposite 
cases. Second, the court fails to apply the Katz test meaningfully in 
locked common area cases. Third, the court overlooks the fact that the 
Fourth Amendment's protections are not limited to the home. 
The Second Circuit first considered whether a tenant has a reason­
able expectation of privacy within the locked common areas of his 
40. See, e.g., United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255-56 (2d Cir. 1985) (listing cases). 
The Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have been grouped into a majority, not 
only because each refuses to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in locked com­
mon areas, but also because the reasoning and analysis of each bear striking similarities to 
the others. See infra notes 45-136 and accompanying text. 
41. See infra notes 45-136 and accompanying text. 
42. But see Holland, 755 F.2d at 256 (bolstering its conclusion by noting that the defen­
dant did not have an absolute right to exclude others); United States v. Penco, 612 F.2d 19, 
25 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting that the officers' entry was peaceful); United States v. Conti, 361 
F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1966) (same). 
43. Contra United States v. Mccaster, 193 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1999) (determining, after 
careful consideration, that the defendant had no subjective expectation of privacy). As 
pointed out infra note 124 and accompanying text, this is an anomaly in the majority's juris­
prudence. 
44. The first exception arises in United States v. Miguel, 340 F.2d 812, 814 (2d Cir. 1965). 
See infra note 48. The second exception arises in United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 n.2 
(8th Cir. 1977) (citing McDonald to support the proposition that "an expectation of privacy 
would ordinarily cover conversations that took place insicle . . . [the defendant's] apart­
ment"). It is not at all clear why the Eighth Circuit cited McDonald for this purpose, as 
McDonald had nothing to do with conversations within an apartment. See infra Section II.A. 
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apartment building in United States v. Miguel.45 The court concluded 
that the Fourth Amendment's protections that ensure the security and 
privacy of a tenant within his apartment do not extend to the lobby of 
an apartment building that is guarded by a door usually kept locked.46 
The court cited no authority for this conclusion.47 Nevertheless, the 
Second Circuit has relied upon this unsupported conclusion as the ba­
sis for much of its subsequent jurisprudence in this area.48 
Although the genesis of the Second Circuit's case law in the com­
mon area context preceded Katz,49 neither the Supreme Court's decla­
ration that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,"50 nor 
the two-part Katz test51 affected the Second Circuit's approach to this 
issue after Katz.52 Instead, the court continued to rely on its holding in 
Miguel.53 Moreover, Katz entirely escaped the Second Circuit's notice 
45. 340 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1965). 
46. Miguel, 340 F.2d at 814 (rejecting the defendant's contention that his arrest in the 
lobby of his apartment building was illegal because the lobby was within the "curtilage" of 
his residence). 
47. Id. The entirety of the court's reasoning is as follows: "We have been cited to no 
authority which would include the lobby of a multi-tenanted apartment house within the 
'curtilage' of each tenant. Such authority as there is points the other way." Id. The court did 
not mention what authority this might have been; instead, it summarily dismissed the defen­
dant's claim. See id. 
48. See, e.g., United States v. Conti, 361 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding that the 
Fourth Amendment protection accorded to an apartment dweller's home does not extend to 
an area just inside a hallway door that was meant to lock but did not). The court relied solely 
on Miguel to conclude that "a lobby of an apartment house, guarded by a door usually kept 
locked . . .  is not a protected area within which the individual tenants have Fourth Amend­
ment rights." Conti, 361 F.2d at 157. The Court also distinguished the case from McDonald 
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), on the basis that the police officers' entry in the case at 
bar was peaceable, and it cited United States v. Buchner, 164 F. Supp. 836 (D.D.C. 1958), 
aff d per curiam, 268 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1958), and United States v. St. Clair, 240 F. Supp. 
338 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), to support the proposition that "a technical trespass" will not defeat an 
otherwise permissible search. Conti, 361 F.2d at 157. See also i1J.fra notes 163-164 and accom­
panying text (arguing that a distinction on this basis is improper); infra Section II.A (dis­
cussing McDonald). 
49. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a 
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the ex­
pectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "). 
52. The Second Circuit's first failure to address Katz came in United States v. Soyka, 394 
F.2d 443, 450 n.2 (2d Cir. 1968) (upholding entry by federal officers into an unlocked apart­
ment building citing). The Court did not even mention Katz and declined, in a footnote and 
without explanation, to reconsider its holdings in Miguel and Conti. Id. The Second Circuit 
again failed to address Katz in United States v. Wilkes, 451 F.2d 938, 941 n.6 (2d Cir. 1971) 
(dismissing the defendant's contention that government agents violated his Fourth Amend­
ment rights when they entered an unlocked apartment building, walked along a common 
vestibule, and positioned themselves outside the defendant's apartment door, citing only to 
Miguel, Conti, and Soyka). 
53. See supra notes 48, 52. 
282 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:273 
in common area cases until 1979, where in United States v. Penco,54 the 
court summarily dispensed with Katz by stating, "The argument that 
the privacy expectations analysis of Katz v. United States somehow 
undercut the reasoning of Miguel and [United States v.] Conti was ex­
pressly considered and rejected by our Court in United States v. 
Llanes."55 
An examination of United States v. Llanes,56 however, proves oth­
erwise. In that case, the defendant relied on Katz to contend that a 
government agent, in stationing himself in the unlocked hallway of the 
defendant's apartment building and eavesdropping on his conversa­
tions, violated his Fourth Amendment right to privacy.57 His conten­
tion was, in essence, that overheard conversations are constitutionally 
protected and therefore inadmissible as evidence.58 The court rejected 
the argument that Katz forbids official eavesdropping altogether and 
invoked the Katz qualification, "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to 
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection."59 The court concluded that conversations 
carried on in a manner that makes them accessible to an individual 
standing outside a person's apartment are conversations "knowingly 
exposed to the public."00 The assumption implicit in this conclusion is 
that the unlocked hallway in this case was a public place in which the 
police officer had a right to be. 
The Penco court was incorrect in stating that Llanes resolved the 
question of whether the Katz privacy expectation analysis undercut 
the Second Circuit's reasoning in Miguel and Conti.61 The question the 
Llanes court implicitly considered was whether an unlocked hallway in 
an apartment building was a public place.62 The court assumed that it 
was, but it did not consider whether a tenant's expectation of privacy 
54. 612 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1979) (relying on Miguel, Conti, and Wilkes to support the con­
clusion that government agents did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights 
by, inter alia, stationing themselves in the locked common hallway outside the defendant's 
doorway, because their illegal entry was made in a peaceful manner). 
55. Penco, 612 F.2d at 25 (internal citations omitted). 
56. 398 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1968). 
57. Llanes, 398 F.2d at 883-84. 
58. Id. at 884. 
59. Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)) (alternation in original). 
60. Id. 
61. See United States v. Penco, 612 F.2d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 1979). 
62. Llanes, 398 F.2d at 884; see also United States v. Case, 435 F.2d 766, 768-69 (7th Cir. 
1970) (distinguishing Llanes on the grounds that the door to the common area in the case at 
bar was locked, hence the hallway in question was not a public area); Commonwealth v. 
Hall, 323 N.E.2d 319, 322 (Mass. 1975) (holding "that where a common area in an apartment 
building is not locked off, so that anyone can enter it, a tenant cannot complain if a police­
man stationing himself there overhears a conversation in the apartment") (citing, inter alia, 
United States v. Llanes, 398 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1968)). 
October 2002) Fourth Amendment 283 
within the locked common areas of an apartment building, the issue at 
bar in both pre-Katz cases, met the two-part test set forth in Katz.63 
The Penco court failed to distinguish locked common areas from un­
locked common areas and, instead, assumed that a locked door was 
irrelevant to a Fourth Amendment analysis.64 Such an assumption is 
unjustified. In a Katz analysis, the distinction between a locked com­
mon area and an unlocked common area can play an important role in 
establishing both a subjective expectation of privacy and the reason­
ableness of that expectation.65 Accordingly, the Second Circuit's reli­
ance on Llanes to distinguish Katz in the locked common area context 
is misplaced. 
The Second Circuit unequivocally reaffirmed its position on the 
locked common area question in United States v. Holland.66 The court 
stated, "[I]t is the established law of this Circuit that the common halls 
and lobbies of multi-tenant buildings are not within an individual ten­
ant's zone of privacy even though they are guarded by locked doors."67 
In reaching this conclusion, the court placed great weight on the fact 
that the Supreme Court has not recognized common hallways as part 
of the home for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.68 
Even if the Second Circuit is correct in asserting a common hall­
way is not part of the home for purposes of the Fourth Amendment,69 
the court's subsequent conclusion that hallways are automatically out-
63. See Llanes, 398 F.2d at 884. 
64. See Penco, 612 F.2d at 25. 
65. See, e.g., Case, 435 F.2d at 768-69; see also supra note 62. 
66. 755 F.2d 253, 254-55 (2d Cir. 1985) (rejecting the defendant's contention that his 
warrantless arrest, effected in the Jocked common hallway of his apartment building, took 
place within his home and was therefore unconstitutional); see also Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573, 576 (1980) (holding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits government officials 
from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to exe­
cute a routine felony arrest). 
67. Holland, 755 F.2d at 255. The Second Circuit cited the following cases in support of 
this proposition: United States v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 686 F.2d 93, 101-02 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(holding, without citing authority or offering an explanation, that the common hallways out­
side the defendant's apartment were public places); United States v. Arboleda, 633 F.2d 985, 
991 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the defendant "had no legitimate expectation of privacy with 
respect to an object which he threw outside the apartment (onto an exterior fire escape] with 
the object of getting rid of it"); Penco, 612 F.2d at 24-25; United States v. Corcione, 592 F.2d 
111, 118 (2d Cir. 1979) (noticing, but not reaching, the issue of whether the defendant's ar­
rest "on the landing outside his actual apartment although inside the house owned by his 
stepbrother's father" was within his "home" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment); 
United States v. Wilkes, 451 F.2d 938, 941 n.6 (2d Cir. 1971); Llanes, 398 F.Zd at 883-84; 
United States v. Conti, 361 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1966); and United States v. Miguel, 340 
F.2d 812, 814 (2d Cir. 1965). 
68. Holland, 755 F.2d at 255. 
69. This Note does not address this particular issue because it is irrelevant to the argu­
ment advanced. See infra notes 216-222 and accompanying text. 
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side the zone of privacy70 protected by the Fourth Amendment is not 
justified. The Supreme Court has categorically rejected the notion that 
the Fourth Amendment protects only the home or other limited 
locales.71 Instead, the Court has broadly stated, "[T]he Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places."72 In light of this principle, a 
consideration of tenants' privacy interests within locked common ar­
eas deserves more careful scrutiny under the Katz test. 
The Holland court neglected meaningfully to apply the Katz test 
and, instead, based its reasoning upon an unduly narrow view of the 
Fourth Amendment that the Supreme Court here rejected in Katz and 
other cases.73 The court reached its conclusion by relying on cases that 
either are not on point or lack persuasive authority.74 The Second 
Circuit continues to adhere to the position it adopted in Holland, 
paying lip service to Katz while summarily dismissing any claim to pri­
vacy.75 
2. The Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit has fared no better in the locked common 
area context because it relies on inapposite cases and the faulty analy­
sis of the Second and Eighth Circuits.76 In United States v. 
70. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 361 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The 
Fourth Amendment was designed . . to grant the individual a zone of privacy whose protec­
tions could be breached only where the 'reasonable' requirements of the probable-cause 
standard were met."). 
71. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8 (1977) (rejecting the Government's ar­
gument that "the Warrant Clause was . . .  intended to guard only against intrusions into the 
home"); see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 587-88 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
("The Government's principal contention was that 'the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause 
protects only interests traditionally identified with the home.' We categorically rejected that 
contention, relying on the history and text of the Amendment, the policy underlying the 
warrant requirement, and a line of cases spanning over a century of our jurisprudence.''). 
72. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
73. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 8; Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
74. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing these Second Circuit cases). 
75. See United States v. Barrios-Moriera, 872 F.2d 12, 14-15 (2d Cir. 1989) (rejecting the 
defendant's Fourth Amendment claim to a legitimate expectation of privacy in the locked 
common hallway of his apartment building) (citing United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 
(1976); United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Martinez­
Gonzalez, 686 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1982)); see also supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text 
(discussing Holland); supra note 67 (discussing Martinez-Gonzalez). It is not at all clear why 
the court cited Santana, as that case considered whether an officer's warrantless entry into a 
house while in "hot pursuit" of a suspect violated the Fourth Amendment and does not 
stand for the proposition that tenants have no expectation of privacy in common hallways, 
locked or otherwise. See Santana, 427 U.S. 38; infra note 108; see also United States v. 
Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 551 n.2 (6th Cir. 1976). 
76. See infra notes 97-125 and accompanying text (discussing the Eighth Circuit's ap­
proach). 
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Concepcion,77 the court's sole case addressing the precise question of 
whether a tenant has a constitutionally protected privacy interest 
within the locked common areas of an apartment building, the court 
held that a tenant could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
these areas.78 The court stated that it was odd to think of an expecta­
tion of privacy in an entryway, and this view, coupled with the defen­
dant's inability to exclude absolutely all others from the common 
areas, led the court to conclude that no Fourth Amendment protection 
attaches in these types of situations.79 The court justified its holding 
with citations to two Seventh Circuit cases80 and a combination of 
Second,81 Fifth,82 and Eighth Circuit83 cases. 
· 
Although on its face the Seventh Circuit seems to marshal a fair 
amount of support for its conclusion, a brief examination of the cases 
77. 942 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1991). 
78. Concepcion, 942 F.2d at 1172 (addressing whether police entry into the locked com­
mon area of the defendant's apartment building was an unreasonable search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment). 
Id. 
79. The court provided the following analysis: 
Concepcion could not assert an expectation of 'privacy' in the common area . . .  because the 
other five tenants sharing the same entrance used the space and could admit as many guests 
as they pleased; Concepcion had no expectation that goings-on in the common areas would 
remain his secret. Indeed, it is odd to think of an expectation of 'privacy' in the entrances to 
a building .. . .  The area outside one's door lacks anything like the privacy of the area inside. 
We think the district court on solid ground in holding that a tenant has no reasonable expec­
tation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building. 
80. The Concepcion court first cites to United States v. Acevedo, 627 F.2d 68, 69 n.1 (7th 
Cir. 1980). In Acevedo, the court relied upon United States v. Penco, 612 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 
1979), and United States v. Shima, 545 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1977), to dismiss the defendant's 
claim to Fourth Amendment protection in an unlocked gangway between his apartment and 
an adjacent tavern. While Shima is on point as to whether the defendant had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in an exterior walkway open and available to the general public, it is 
inapposite to those areas that are enclosed or locked (such as those at issue in Concepcion). 
See supra note 5 (discussing the law of unlocked common areas). Penco and the cases on 
which it relies trace their intellectual and legal origin to blind assumptions and unsupported 
conclusions. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing Penco and its origins). The 
second case that the Concepcion court relies upon is United States v. Boden, 854 F.2d 983, 
990 (7th Cir. 1987). Concepcion, 942 F.2d at 1172. The Boden court declined to recognize an 
expectation of privacy in the common areas of a walk-in storage unit facility. Boden, 854 
F.2d at 990. The court accorded great weight to the fact that the defendant lacked an abso­
lute subjective expectation of privacy and analogized to the common areas of a locked 
apartment building before concluding that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy. Id. It cited Acevedo as its only authority on this ground. Id. 
81. Concepcion, 942 F.2d at 1172 (citing United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 
1985), and United States v. Penco, 612 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1979)); see also supra note 54 and 
accompanying text (discussing Holland and Penco). 
82. Concepcion, 942 F.2d at 1172 (citing United States v. Shima, 560 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 
1977) ); see also supra notes 5, 80 (discussing Shima). 
83. Concepcion, 942 F.2d at 1172 (citing United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 
1977) ); see also infra notes 97-125 and accompanying text (discussing Eisler). 
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cited reveals the court's authority as nothing more than a paper tiger.84 
For example, the Seventh Circuit cited a Fifth Circuit case, United 
States v. Shima,85 in support of the proposition that there is no consti­
tutionally protected privacy interest within the locked common areas 
of an apartment building.86 The Seventh Circuit's reliance on Shima, 
however, was misplaced. The question in that case was whether a per­
son had a reasonable expectation of privacy in an exterior walkway 
open and available to the general public; the court did not consider 
whether such an expectation exists in areas that are enclosed or 
locked.87 
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit avoided any meaningful analysis 
of two of its past cases whose holdings weighed against the court's 
newly adopted position. In United States v. Case,88 the Seventh Circuit 
considered whether the defendants had a right to privacy in a locked 
common hallway used by only a small number of people. The court 
found that because the hallway was not a public place, the defendants' 
privacy interests enjoyed constitutional protection.89 The Case court 
distinguished Llanes90 on the basis that, while the unlocked hallway in 
Llanes may have been a "public place," the locked hallway in the case 
at bar was not.91 Consequently, the court held that the officers' war­
rantless entry into the locked common area violated the defendants' 
Fourth Amendment rights.92 In United States v. Rosenberg,93 the court 
84. Shima simply is not on point. See supra notes 5, 80; infra note 108. Boden relies 
solely upon Acevedo. See supra note 80. Acevedo's only source of authority that supports the 
breath of its holding is Penco. See supra note 80. The flaws in both Penco and Holland were 
discussed above. See supra notes 54-74 and accompanying text. The flaws in Eisler are dis­
cussed at length infra notes 97-125 and accompanying text. 
85. 560 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1977). 
86. See Concepcion, 942 F.2d at 1172 (citing United States v. Shima, 560 F.2d 1287 (5th 
Cir. 1977)). 
87. See supra notes 5, 80. 
88. 435 F.2d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1970). 
89. Case, 435 F.2d at 768. 
90. United States v. Llanes, 398 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1968); see also supra notes 56-65 and 
accompanying text (discussing Llanes). 
91. The Seventh Circuit reasoned as follows: 
Llanes, however, is based upon the finding that the hallway was a public place and that the 
defendants could hardly expect conversations audible to someone in a public place to be re­
garded as private. On the contrary, the district judge in this case found that the hallway 'was 
not such a public area as to entitle the Court to consider it a non-protected area' and we 
concur. The hallway was kept locked .... The hallway was used by a very confined group, 
and, most of the time, limited to the proprietors of the stores in the building. 
Case, 435 F.2d at 768-69 (internal citation omitted). 
92. Id. at 767-68 (holding for the defendant notwithstanding the fact that police officers 
had obtained a key from the landlord). 
93. 416 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1969). 
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held that government officials' warrantless entry into the unlocked, 
but closed, basement of a commercial building violated the Fourth 
Amendment.94 
The court disposed of these cases by stating, without any explana­
tion or justification: "To the extent that United States v. Rosenberg and 
United States v. Case imply otherwise, they have not survived changes 
in the Supreme Court's definition of protected privacy interests. "95 It is 
not at all clear why the court asserts that these two cases have not sur­
vived changes in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, and there is little 
indication that either case has been overruled.96 
3. The Eighth Circuit 
The Eighth Circuit independently developed its own line of cases 
in the locked common area context. Its analysis in this area, however, 
proves little better than that of the circuits discussed above because it 
relies on the mistaken premise that an absolute right to exclude is nec­
essary to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy. In its seminal 
case, United States v. Eisler,97 the Eighth Circuit rejected the defen­
dant's contention that police officers violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights when they entered the locked common hallway of his apartment 
building and eavesdropped outside his door.98 The court invoked the 
Katz test, but it concluded that the defendant had no legitimate expec­
tation of privacy within the locked common areas of his apartment 
building because those areas were open to use by other tenants, their 
guests, the landlord, and other authorized individuals.99 The court re­
fused to recognize the defendant's limited privacy interests in these 
areas as meriting constitutional protection, stating, "An expectation of 
privacy necessarily implies an expectation that one will be free of any 
intrusion, not merely unwarranted intrusions."100 The court offered no 
94. Rosenberg, 416 F.2d at 682-83 (rejecting the government's argument "that the com­
mercial nature of the building constituted an implied invitation to enter" and holding that 
the government agents' entry was unlawful). 
95. United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1991) (internal citations 
omitted). 
96. While the portion of the court's holding in Case regarding the landlord's grant of 
permission to enter the premises may no longer be accurate in light of United States v. 
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974), this in no way overrules the court's holding that the 
locked hallway was a protected area. 
97. 567 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1977). 
98. Eisler, 567 F.2d at 815-16. 
99. Id. at 816. 
100. Id. (alternation in original). 
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support for the proposition that an absolute right to exclude is neces­
sary to establish a protected expectation of privacy.101 
The fact that tenants do not have an absolute right to exclude all 
others from the locked common areas of their buildings should not 
obliterate their constitutional interests in these areas. Numerous 
Supreme Court decisions102 affirm the maxim that "[p]rivacy is not a 
discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all."103 Rather, the 
scope of protection offered by the Fourth Amendment is colored in 
shades of gray. So long as an individual has some expectation of pri­
vacy, the Court has held that, with few exceptions,104 the government 
may not tread there without prior approval by a neutral magistrate. 105 
This principle applies with equal force to the locked common areas of 
apartment buildings. While tenants cannot expect to be free from ob­
servation by other tenants and their guests, they do expect to be free 
from the prying senses of trespassers and uninvited strangers.106 
While the Supreme Court has been unwilling to find a Fourth 
Amendment violation where government agents make an observation 
from an area where anyone has a right to be,107 it has continued to rec-
101. Id.; see also United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1242 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that 
the right to exclude must be absolute to merit any Fourth Amendment protection); United 
States v. Boden, 854 F. 2d 983, 990 (7th Cir. 1988) (same); United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 
253, 256 (2d Cir. 1985) (same). 
102. Consider the Court's reasoning in Bond v. United States: 
[A] law enforcement officer's physical manipulation of a bus passenger's carry-on luggage 
violated the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches . . . .  When a 
bus passenger places a bag in an overhead bin, he expects that other passengers or bus em­
ployees may move it for one reason or another ... . [But.] he does not expect that other pas­
sengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner. 
But this is exactly what the agent did here. 
529 U.S. 334, 335, 338-39 (2000); see also Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313-15 
(1978) (holding that while an employer's privacy interest was not absolute, it was neverthe­
less protected by the Fourth Amendment). 
103. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
104. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582-83 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (list­
ing exceptions to the warrant requirement); United States v Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 689 n.l 
(1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) (listing exceptions based on "special law enforcement 
needs"). 
105. See, e.g., Bond, 529 U.S. at 338-39; Camara v Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533-34 
(1967); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948). 
106. See, e.g., McDonald, 335 U.S. at 458 (Jackson, J., concurring); State v. Di Bartolo, 
276 So. 2d 291, 294 (La. 1973) ("The fact that the location where the arrest took place was a 
hallway, not an integral part of the apartment which the defendant was visiting, does not vi­
tiate the defendant's right to reasonably expect privacy from government intrusion."). 
107. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a person knowingly ex­
poses to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection."); see also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (holding that police observation 
of a greenhouse from a helicopter passing at an altitude of 400 feet did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding that police observa­
tion of a backyard from an airplane flying at an altitude of 1,000 feet did not violate the de­
fendant's reasonable expectation of privacy). In these cases, the Court reasoned that since 
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ognize a constitutionally protected interest in those areas where indi­
viduals have a right to exclude at least some people.108 In O'Connor v. 
Ortega,109 for example, the Court held that a government employee 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, even though "it is 
the nature of government offices that others - such as fellow employ­
ees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general public - may 
have frequent access to an individual's office."110 Again in Chapman v. 
United States,1 1 1  the Court held that government agents' search of a 
rented house violated the tenant's Fourth Amendment rights even 
though the landlord had authority to enter the house for some pur­
poses.112 As Justice Scalia insightfully pointed out, the Fourth 
Amendment protects privacy, not solitude.113 While landlords and ten­
ants may invite police officers into the locked common areas of their 
buildings without infringing on other tenants' reasonable expectation 
of privacy, this fact should not justify unauthorized, warrantless gov­
ernment intrusion into areas from which the public is excluded.114 The 
any member of the public could have lawfully observed the defendants' properties by flying 
overhead, the defendants' expectations of privacy were not ones that society was prepared to 
recognize as reasonable. The questions in those cases differ in one material respect from the 
question presented by the controversy under discussion here. Those cases were decided on 
the basis that "any member of the public" had a right to be in the airspace above the defen­
dants' property and could have seen what the officers saw. The locked common areas of 
apartment buildings, on the other hand, are not open to "any member of the public;" rather, 
they are exclusive in nature and have been reasonably secured against unauthorized entry. 
108. Some circuit courts claim that United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), holds 
that the hallways of apartment buildings are public places. See, e.g., United States v. 
Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing Santana as supporting the proposition 
that "[t]he hallway of an apartment building, as with the threshold of one's dwelling, is a 
'public' place for purposes of interpreting the Fourth Amendment"). Contrary to this claim, 
Santana did not hold that the hallway of an apartment building is a public place and there­
fore outside the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Santana concerned "hot pursuit," and 
the Court held that a suspect could not defeat an arrest commenced in a public place - the 
threshold of the defendant's house - by retreating within. It made no statement about hall­
ways, locked or otherwise. The leap from a threshold to interior hallways is unwarranted, 
especially when one considers the factors that led the Court to conclude that the threshold is 
a public place. A threshold, where a person is "not merely visible to the public but [is] ex­
posed to public view, speech, hearing and touch as if . . .  standing completely outside her 
house," Santana, 427 U.S. at 42, is materially different than an interior hallway of an apart­
ment complex, especially a locked hallway. There, a tenant is not even visible to the public, 
let alone exposed to public speech, hearing, or touch. 
109. 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
110. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 717 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
111. 365 U.S. 610 (1961). 
112. Chapman, 365 U.S. at 616-17. 
113. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 730 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
114. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), is probative here. In that case the 
Court held that a congressional act authorizing government agents to search places of 
employment for safety violations without first obtaining a warrant violated the Fourth 
Amendment. Id. at 315. The Court stated "[t]hat an employee is free to report, and the 
Government is free to use, any evidence of noncompliance with OSHA that the employee 
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locked common areas of apartment buildings are not open to "any 
member of the public;" rather they are exclusive in nature and merit 
recognition by society as an area in which a tenant has a legitimate, al­
though limited, expectation of privacy.115 This is especially true given 
the fact that these locked areas are in close proximity to tenants' 
homes.116 
Contrary to what some courts suggest, there is not a parallel line of 
Supreme Court precedent standing for the proposition that an expec­
tation of privacy is violated only if the place is one that the defendant 
has the right to keep subject to his exclusive control.117 In Rakas v. 
lllinois,118 the Supreme Court pointed to the passengers' inability to 
exclude others as one of many factors that established that the defen­
dants did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in an automo­
bile in which they had neither a property nor possessory interest.119 
The Court did not state that an absolute right to exclude is necessary 
to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy; rather, it pointed 'to 
the defendants' complete inability to exclude.120 Moreover, the Court 
highlighted the fact that the defendants "made no showing that they 
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or 
the area under the seat of the car in which they were merely passen­
gers."121 Tenants in an apartment building are in a materially different 
position than the passengers in Rakas. They do have the right to ex­
clude those who have not been invited in by other tenants or the 
landlord, and they do have an interest in the privacy and security of 
observes furnishes no justification for federal agents to enter a place of business from which 
the public is restricted and to conduct their own warrantless search." Id. 
115. See Perkins v. United States, 432 F.2d 612, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazelon, J., dis­
senting). 
116. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 n.4 (1986) (declining to rec­
ognize a privacy interest in an industrial area in part because "this is not an area immediately 
adjacent to a private home, where privacy expectations are most heightened"); California v. 
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (noting that privacy expectations are most heightened in 
those areas intimately linked to the home); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 
U.S. 297, 313 (1972) ("[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the word­
ing of the Fourth Amendment is directed."). 
117. See United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 149 (1978)). 
118. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
1 1 9. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148-49 (holding that passengers in a vehicle, who had neither a 
property nor a possessory interest in the vehicle, had no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the glove compartment and the area under the seat). 
120. Id. at 149; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980) (holding that the 
defendant's complete inability to exclude was a factor undermining his claim to an expecta­
tion of privacy in the purse of a third party into which he had dumped thousands of dollars 
worth of illegal drugs). 
121. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148. 
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their apartment buildings.122 Consequently, tenants' incomplete right 
to exclude is no reason for courts to deny their constitutional claims. 
The Eighth Circuit has repeatedly reaffirmed Eisler,123 and al­
though the court has recently shown a willingness to apply the Katz 
test meaningfully in locked common area cases,124 the court's holding 
in Eisler remains good law.125 As that holding is based upon a mistaken 
premise, namely that an absolute right to exclude is a necessary pre­
requisite for Fourth Amendment protection, it should be rejected. 
4. The Ninth Circuit 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit's resolution of the locked common areas 
question is also unsatisfactory. In United States v. Nohara,126 the court 
refused to recognize a defendant's privacy interest in the locked hall­
way outside his apartment. In refusing to recognize this interest, the 
court relied upon dicta from one of its earlier cases,127 cited an inappo­
site case,128 and relied upon the faulty reasoning of the Second129 and 
122 See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 458 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring); 
State v. Di Bartolo, 276 So. 2d 291, 294 (La. 1973); Commonwealth v. Goldoff, 510 N.E.2d 
277, 280 {Mass. App. Ct. 1987). 
123. See United States v. Luschen, 614 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1980) {declining, without ex­
planation, to reverse its holding in Eisler); see also United States v. McGrane, 746 F.2d 632, 
634 (8th Cir. 1984) (reaffirming the court's position that there is no expectation of privacy in 
the hallways of an apartment building) (citing United States v. Luschen, 614 F.2d 1164 (8th 
Cir. 1980); United States v. Penco, 612 F.2d 19 {2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Eisler, 567 
F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1977)). 
124. See United States v. McCaster, 193 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1999) (examining whether a 
tenant in a duplex has a reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas shared only by 
the duplex's tenants and the landlord). The court invoked the Katz test and disposed of the 
case after it determined that the defendant had no sul;>jective expectation of privacy on the 
particular set of facts presented in this case. Id. at 933. In evaluating the defendant's claim, 
the court looked to several factors: "whether the party has a possessory interest in the things 
seized or the place searched; whether the party can exclude others from that place; whether 
the party took precautions to maintain the privacy; and whether the party had a key to the 
premises." Id. The court concluded that the defendant had no subjective expectation of pri­
vacy in this case because he disavowed any possessory interests in the material, had not tried 
to exclude anyone, and had taken no steps to maintain privacy in that area. Id. 
125. See, e.g., United States v. King, 227 F.3d 732, 745 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing United 
States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1977), as valid law). 
126. 3 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 1993). 
127. Nohara, 3 F.3d at 1241 ("The hallway of an apartment building, as with the thresh­
old of one's dwelling, is a 'public' place for purposes of interpreting the Fourth Amend­
ment.") (quoting dictum from United States v. Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 1976)); 
see also supra note 108 (criticizing Calhoun). 
128. Id. at 1242 (citing United States v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554 (1st Cir. 1976)); see 
also supra note 5 (discussing Cruz Pagan). 
129. Id. (citing United States v. Barrios-Moriera, 872 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 
discussion supra notes 2, 3, 75 (discussing Barrios-Moriera). 
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Eighth Circuits.130 The court noted the Sixth Circuit's holding in 
Carriger131 but summarily rejected it.132 Finally, the Ninth Circuit 
joined the Eighth in stating that an absolute right to exclude is a pre­
condition for a constitutionally recognizable expectation of privacy.133 
In addition to the problems noted above, the Ninth Circuit also 
failed adequately to address United States v. Fluker,134 an earlier Ninth 
Circuit case holding that a tenant had a reasonable expectation of pri­
vacy in the locked hallway outside his apartment.135 The court brushed 
that case aside by noting that Fluker was limited to its facts. The court 
also pointed out that the apartment in Fluker was only one of two 
basement apartments, not an apartment in a multi-unit complex.136 
The court did not, however, discuss why the distinction between the 
two types of common areas should make a difference for constitu­
tional purposes, nor did it explain why the absence of an absolute right 
to exclude was not determinative in Fluker, whereas the same condi­
tion barred the defendant's claim in the case at bar. 
II. BROADLY INTERPRETING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IS 
CONSISTENT WITH SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the precise question of 
whether a tenant has a reasonable expectation of privacy within the 
locked common areas of an apartment complex. This Part argues, 
however, that a fair reading of relevant Supreme Court precedent de­
mands that the provisions of the Fourth Amendment be interpreted to 
protect tenants' expectations of privacy within these areas. Section 
II.A argues that Justice Jackson's concurrence in McDonald should 
govern the current controversy. Section 11.B argues that the Supreme 
Court's commitment to protecting privacy interests in and around the 
home calls for an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that pro-
130. Id. (citing United States v. McGrane, 746 F.2d 632, 634 (8th Cir. 1984), United 
States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1977)); see also supra notes 97-125 and accompanying 
text (discussing McGrane and Eisler). 
131. United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976); see also supra notes 23-34 
and accompanying text {discussing Carriger). 
132. Noham, 3 F.3d at 1242. 
133. Id. (citing United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 1977), as its exclusive 
authority on this point). 
134. 543 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1976). 
135. Fluker, 543 F.2d at 716 (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy because "the 
entry way was one to which access was clearly limited as a matter of right to the occupants of 
the two basement apartments, and it is undisputed that the outer doorway was always locked 
and that only the occupants of the two apartments and the landlord had keys thereto"). 
136. Nohara, 3 F.3d at 1242 (declining to extend Fluker because the Fluker Court lim­
ited that case to its facts). 
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tects tenants from unauthorized, warrantless searches by government 
agents in locked common areas. 
A. McDonald v. United States Should Govern the Current 
Controversy 
The best reading of McDonald137 reveals that a tenant does have a 
constitutionally protected privacy interest within the locked common 
areas of his apartment building. At issue in that case was whether 
police officers violated the defendant's right to be secure from 
unreasonable search and seizure when they entered the locked com­
mon area of his rooming house without a search warrant.138 Police 
officers peered into the defendant's room from the locked common 
areas of the rooming house, which they entered by prying open a 
window.139 The officers arrested the defendant and searched his room 
after observing, from their position within the hallway, the defendant 
engaged in illegal activity within his room.140 The Court found for the 
defendant, stating, "Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth 
Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the 
police."141 As the police claimed no emergency in this case, the Court 
concluded that faithful adherence to constitutional principles would 
not tolerate the absence of a search warrant.142 
There are three possible interpretations of the Court's holding in 
this case.143 First, McDonald can be seen as a condemnation of the of­
ficers' presence in the locked common area as a violation of the de­
fendant's Fourth Amendment right to privacy. Second, looking only to 
the language of the Court's opinion, McDonald can be seen as merely 
condemning the government's failure to secure a warrant given the 
circumstances of the case.144 Finally, McDonald can be seen as a con­
demnation of the officers' violent entry into a locked building.145 
137. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948). 
1 38. Id. at 453. 
139. Id.; id. at 457-58, 460-61 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at 455 (Douglas, J., for the Court). 
142. Id. at 456. 
143. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 9.l(b) (3d ed. 2000) 
("[A] majority of the Court never responded specifically to the government's argument that 
McDonald could not complain of the police intrusion into his landlady's portion of the 
premises . . . .  "). 
144. The following passage is illustrative: 
We will not assume that where a defendant has been under surveillance for months, no 
search warrant could have been obtained . . . .  Moreover, when we move to the scene of the 
crime, the reason for the absence of a search warrant is even less obvious. When the officers 
heard the adding machine and, at the latest, when they saw what was transpiring in the 
room, they certainly had adequate grounds for seeking a search warrant. 
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Justice Jackson explained the Court's holding in this first manner 
in his concurring opinion.146 His opinion constitutes the best reading of 
this case because it explains the Court's holding in a way that makes it 
both internally consistent and harmonious with the Supreme Court's 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Consequently, the Supreme Court 
should recognize Justice Jackson's concurrence as authoritative and 
should recognize a tenant's expectation of privacy within the locked 
common areas of an apartment building as legitimate. 
Justice Jackson saw the case before the Court as raising the issue 
of whether police officers violated the defendant's Fourth 
Amendment right to privacy and security when they entered the 
locked hallway from which they observed the defendant's illegal ac­
tivity.147 He concluded that "each tenant of a building, while he has no 
right to exclude from the common hallways those who enter lawfully, 
does have a personal and constitutionally protected interest in the in­
tegrity and security of the entire building against unlawful breaking 
and entry."148 Justice Jackson explained that a tenant's constitutionally 
protected interests should not vanish merely because the unlawful 
breaking and entering comes at the hands of government agents.149 
This rationale applies with equal force in the setting of the locked 
common areas of apartment buildings. The only difference between 
the facts presented in McDonald and the controversy under discussion 
here is that one setting was a rooming house while the other is an 
apartment building.150 As such, courts should recognize tenants' expec­
tations of privacy within the locked common areas of their apartment 
buildings. 
An alternative reading of McDonald views that case as merely 
condemning the government agents' failure to secure a warrant where 
it was practical for them to do so. This reading is unsatisfactory, how­
ever, because it does not comport with the Supreme Court's holdings 
McDonald, 335 U.S. at 454-55. 
145. See, e.g., United States v. Conti, 361 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1966) (distinguishing 
McDonald on the basis that the police officers' entry in that case was violent, whereas the 
entry in the case at bar was peaceful). 
146. McDonald, 335 U.S. at 458 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
147. Id. at 458-59 (Jackson, J., concurring) (focusing on the defendant's privacy interests 
in the hallway and not solely within the four corners of his room). 
148. Id. at 458; see also id. at 459 (noting that the police "were guilty of breaking and 
entering - a felony in law and a crime far more serious than the one they were engaged in 
suppressing"). 
149. See id. at 458-59. 
150. See infra Section 11.B (arguing that the Fourth Amendment is violated regardless of 
whether police officers conduct a search or seizure within the locked common area of an 
apartment building, as in United States v. Barrios-Moriera, 872 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1989), or 
eavesdrop on conversations taking place within an apartment, as in United States v. Eisler, 
567 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1977)). 
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in other Fourth Amendment cases. In McDonald, the Court declined 
to expressly consider whether the police officers' entry into the locked 
common areas of the rooming house violated the defendant's right to 
privacy.151 Instead, the Court rested its opinion on the absence of a 
search warrant, but it failed to state where the search went wrong.152 
This approach begs the question of whether government agents vio­
lated the defendant's rights by their presence in the hallway. If, as the 
government contended, the agents violated only the landlady's Fourth 
Amendment rights by entering the locked building,153 and if the hall­
way is to be considered a public place from a tenant's perspective,154 
then McDonald should have had no standing to raise a constitutional 
complaint. 
The Fourth Amendment has never required a law enforcement of­
ficer to avert his eyes when passing by a home.155 This principle has 
been interpreted broadly, so that even when government agents pass 
by a home in an unusual manner, so long as there is a public right to 
be there, no constitutional complaint will be heard.156 There is no 
question that, in this case, the officers in the hallway observed the de­
fendant engaged in illegal activity.157 Furthermore, it is well settled 
that an officer has the right to arrest a person without a warrant for a 
crime committed in his presence.158 If the officers did not violate the 
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights by their presence in the hall­
way, then their subsequent seizure of the defendant's gambling mate­
rials should have been justified under the plain view doctrine,159 as the 
151. McDonald, 335 U.S. at 454. 
152. Id. at 457 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
153. McDonald, 335 U.S. at 454. 
154. See, e.g., United States v. Penco, 612 F.2d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Llanes, 398 F.2d 880, 884 (2d Cir. 1968). 
155. The Court's approach here is clear: 
The Fourth Amendment . . .  has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to 
shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares. Nor does the mere fact 
that an individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his activities preclude an offi­
cer's observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders 
the activities clearly visible. 
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986). 
156. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (holding that police observation of a 
greenhouse from a helicopter passing at an altitude of 400 feet did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding that police observation of a 
backyard from an airplane flying at an altitude of 1,000 feet did not violate the defendant's 
reasonable expectation of privacy). 
157. McDonald, 335 U.S. at 453. 
158. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 592 (1980); United States v. Watson, 
423 U.S. 411, 440 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 316 
(1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156-57 (1925). 
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cash, adding machines, and gambling slips were clearly visible in the 
room.160 
The language of the opinion also seems to indicate that had the 
landlady independently admitted the officers, the defendant would 
have had no valid constitutional complaint.161 This conclusion seems 
inconsistent with the lack of a warrant as the sole basis for the Court's 
opinion; even if the officers had obtained permission, they still would 
have failed to obtain a warrant where it was practical for them to do 
so. A narrow reading of McDonald is further undermined in light of 
the Supreme Court's declaration that "the reasonableness of a search 
does not depend upon the practicability of obtaining a search war­
rant."162 Taken together, these factors indicate that the holding in 
McDonald must be seen as embracing more than a condemnation of 
the government's failure to obtain a warrant in this particular case. 
Other courts agree that McDonald is broader than a mere con­
demnation of the government's failure to get a warrant, but they seek 
to limit that case to a condemnation of violent police entry into the 
locked common areas of apartment buildings or rooming houses.163 A 
distinction on this basis, however, is improper. If government agents 
violated McDonald's constitutionally protected expectation of privacy 
and security by violently entering the locked common areas, it is un­
clear why these same interests would not be violated if the officers en­
ter through guile as in Carriger. Likewise, if a tenant relies upon the 
privacy and security offered by a locked door, it is hard to imagine 
that he will be concerned about whether police officers breach these 
interests by blowing a hole in the door or by sneaking through it when 
no one is looking. It is the presence of a trespassing government agent 
that is of concern here, and not the manner in which the agent came to 
be on the premises. This logic is especially clear when one considers 
that even the law of criminal trespass and burglary does not require 
force or violence; rather all that is required is unlawful entry by any 
159. See Horton v California, 496 U.S. 128, 135-36 (1990) ("[A]n object that comes into 
view during a search incident to arrest that is appropriately limited in scope under existing 
law may be seized without a warrant . . . .  What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that 
the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion . . . .  ") (internal 
citations and quotations omitted). 
1 60. McDonald, 335 U.S. at 453. 
161. Id. at 454. 
1 62. Chime) v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 771 (1969) (citing United States v. Rabinowitz, 
339 U.S. 56 (1950)). 
163. See, e.g., United States v. Conti, 361 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1966) (distinguishing 
McDonald from police entry into locked common areas of apartment complexes by claiming 
that the basis for the McDonald holding was that the police officers did not enter in a peace­
ful manner). 
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means.164 Consequently, the argument for drawing a constitutional dis­
tinction based upon whether the government agents breached a locked 
door through violence or through guile should be rejected. 
It is no answer to respond that the law already draws a distinction 
based on a government agent's manner of entry. While it is well set­
tled that no Fourth Amendment interest is implicated if police officers 
are admitted to the common areas at the invitation of the landlord or 
another tenant,165 the issue of illegal police entry is quite different. 
This distinction is justified both in terms of a tenant's subjective expec­
tation of privacy and the reasonableness of that expectation.166 A ten­
ant must expect that other tenants or the landlord can and will admit 
other people into the common areas of his apartment building.167 The 
same cannot be said for a tenant's expectation that police officers will 
break and enter into the common areas of his apartment building.168 
With regard to expectations that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable,169 the Supreme Court has stated that persons who share 
areas with others "assume the risk" that the others may permit police 
officers to look inside.170 This limitation seems eminently reasonable. 
On the other hand, society should be prepared to recognize as reason­
able a tenant's expectation that government agents are not working 
surreptitiously to circumvent their security systems. 
B. The Supreme Court's Commitment to Protecting Privacy Near the 
Home 
The Supreme Court's commitment to protecting privacy interests 
in and around the home calls for an interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment that protects tenants within the locked common areas of 
their apartment buildings from unauthorized, warrantless searches. 
The Court has, for instance, read the Fourth Amendment to protect 
164. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,  § 829(e) (2001) ("A person 'enters' upon prem­
ises when the person introduces any body part or any part of any instrument, by whatever 
means, into or upon the premises."). 
165. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974) ("[Our] cases at least 
make it clear that when the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of vol­
untary consent, it is not limited to proof that consent was given by the defendant, but may 
show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common 
authority over . . .  the premises . . . .  "); United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir. 
2001) (making clear that there is no Fourth Amendment violation where police gain entry to 
locked common areas through the invitation of another tenant). 
166. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
167. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 458 (1948) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring). 
168. Id. 
169. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
170. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969). 
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individuals' privacy interests within the curtilage171 of their private 
homes.172 In fact, the curtilage has been considered "part of home it­
self for Fourth Amendment purposes."173 Consequently, the Fourth 
Amendment protects individuals' privacy expectations within the cur­
tilage itself. 174 There are, of course, exceptions, so that there is no vio­
lation where a police officer comes "upon the land in the same way 
that any member of the public could be expected to do, as by taking 
the normal route of access along a walkway or driveway or onto a 
porch."175 The case is different where an exclusionary fence protects 
the curtilage and officers breach this fence to conduct surveillance of 
persons entering and leaving a house.176 
The Court's curtilage doctrine is helpful in the locked common 
area context for three reasons. First, it underscores the Supreme 
Court's special commitment to protecting privacy interests in close 
proximity to the home. Second, it demonstrates that the Fourth 
Amendment's protection of the area surrounding the home is not lim­
ited to preventing officers from peering into the home; rather it is 
aimed at protecting "the intimate activity associated with the sanctity 
of a man's home and the privacies of life."177 Third, it highlights the in­
equities of the majority approach. Those who happen to live in private 
houses, surrounded by private property that falls within the curtilage 
of these houses, enjoy the Fourth Amendment's protection of their 
privacy.178 Those who live in multi-unit apartment buildings, on the 
other hand, are stripped of their Fourth Amendment rights by virtue 
of the style of housing they have chosen, or have been forced, to 
171. "Curtilage" is defined as "the land immediately surrounding and associated with 
the home," in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984), and as " [t]he land or yard 
adjoining a house, usu. within an enclosure," in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 389 (deluxe 7th 
ed. 1999). 
172. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180. In California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986), the 
Supreme Court noted that while the curtilage was within the Fourth Amendment's protec­
tion, all government observation of that art;a is not necessarily barred by the Fourth 
Amendment. Rather, "[t]he Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been ex­
tended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on 
public thoroughfares." Id. In this case, observation from an airplane was likened to passing 
by a home on a public thoroughfare. Id. 
173. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 1 80 ("Thus, courts have extended Fourth Amendment protec­
tion to the curtilage."). 
174. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 143, § 3.2(c) (pointing out that even "entry of [a 
hallway in the interior of a single family dwelling] is a search"). The resulting syllogism is 
straightforward: The curtilage is considered part of the home. Entry into a part of the home 
constitutes a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, entry into the curti­
lage is also a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
175. Id. 
176. See, e.g., United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992, 994-95 (4th Cir. 1981). 
177. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
178. Id. 
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adopt.179 That is, government agents may not, without a warrant, enter 
the area "immediately surrounding and associated with the home"180 if 
that home is a single-unit residence, but the majority of circuits permit 
them to enter the area "immediately surrounding and associated with 
the home" if that home is located within a locked apartment build­
ing.181 
The reasoning of one of the Court's latest significant Fourth 
Amendment cases, Kyllo v. United States,182 also carries great weight 
here. At issue in this case was whether governmental use of a thermal­
imaging device to detect relative amounts of heat within a private 
home amounted to a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.183 
The Court held that the use of such a device without a warrant vio­
lated the Fourth Amendment and refused to allow government tech­
nology to intrude upon citizens' privacy interests.184 This holding "as­
sure[d) preservation of that degree of privacy against government that 
existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted" and interposed a 
neutral and detached magistrate between citizens and the desires of 
the police.185 
Although the Court framed its holding as imposing limitations on 
governmental use of technology that is not in common public use,186 
the Kyllo opinion must be seen as embracing more. The Court took 
"the long view, from the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
forward,"187 stepping in to eliminate a significant threat to the privacy 
of the home posed by advancing technology. In the majority of circuits 
that have addressed the locked common area question, this privacy in­
terest is threatened to an even greater extent by another feature of 
179. See, e.g., United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that 
"the common halls and lobbies of multi-tenant buildings are not within an individual ten­
ant's zone of privacy even though they are guarded by locked doors"). 
180. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180. 
181. See, e.g., Holland, 755 F.2d at 255. 
182. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
183. Ky/lo, 533 U.S. at 29 (holding that "the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a 
private home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home consti­
tutes a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment"). In this case, government 
agents, suspicious that marijuana was being grown in the defendant's home, used a thermal 
imaging device to scan the home to determine whether the heat emanating from the home 
was consistent with the use of high intensity lamps typically used to grow marijuana indoors. 
Id. at 29. On the basis of this scan, the agents obtained a search warrant for the defendant's 
home, and, upon executing this warrant, they found over 100 marijuana plants. Id. at 30. The 
defendant moved to suppress this evidence, claiming that the agents violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights when they scanned his home. Id. 
184. Id. at 40. 
185. Id. at 34. 
186. Id. at 40. 
187. Id. 
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American society - large, multi-unit apartment complexes subject to 
discretionary searches by police officers. In these types of cases, gov­
ernment officers do not just passively scan residences from a public 
street; instead, they physically trespass188 within private, limited-access 
buildings in hopes of finding contraband or other evidence of wrong­
doing.189 Tenants must worry, not that an officer is scanning their 
homes from across the street,190 but that an officer may be eavesdrop­
ping outside their doors or working to circumvent their security sys­
tems.191 
Taken together, these factors weigh heavily in favor of recognizing 
tenants' expectations of privacy within the locked common areas of 
their apartment buildings. The privacy and security interests an indi­
vidual has in those areas close to the home do not vanish merely be­
cause that person lives in an apartment complex.192 Consequently, 
courts should make room in their Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
to protect these interests where tenants have taken precaution to ex­
clude unauthorized persons from the common areas of their apart­
ment buildings. 
Ill. A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IS 
MOST CONSISTENT WITH THE AMENDMENT'S HISTORY 
AND THE FRAMERS' INTENTIONS 
Interpreting the Fourth Amendment in light of the intent of its 
Framers and with an eye toward the history surrounding its adoption 
demands that the protections embodied within the Amendment be ex­
tended to cover the locked common areas of apartment buildings. The 
Framers designed the provisions of the Fourth Amendment to safe­
guard privacy and limit the discretion of the police,193 but the rule 
188. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948) (noting government 
acknowledgment that its officers' actions constituted trespass); United States v. Conti, 361 
F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1966) (observing that even peaceful entry into locked common areas 
constitutes a technical trespass) (citing several cases for this proposition). 
189. See, e.g., United States v. Barrios-Moriera, 872 F.2d 12, 13-14 (2d Cir. 1989). 
190. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30. 
191. See, e.g., United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 1976). 
192. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 458 (1948) (Jackson, J., concur­
ring) ("[E]ach tenant of a building, while he has no right to exclude from the common hall­
ways those who enter lawfully, does have a personal and constitutionally protected interest 
in the integrity and security of the entire building against unlawful breaking and entry."); 
State v. Di Bartolo, 276 So. 2d 291 , 294 (La. 1973) ("The fact that the location where the ar­
rest took place was a hallway, not an integral part of the apartment which the defendant was 
visiting, does not vitiate the defendant's right to reasonably expect privacy from government 
intrusion."). 
193. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
547, 580, 601 (1999); see also Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for His­
tory, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1726 (1996) ("[T]he historical record suggests that objections 
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adopted by the majority of circuits is inconsistent with the history of 
the Fourth Amendment and the Framers' intent.194 
Although there is little agreement about how much weight should 
be given to the Framers' intentions, most scholars agree that it should 
play at least some role in constitutional interpretation.195 The Supreme 
Court has offered some guidance as to the role history and intent are 
to play in the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, stating that 
"[t]he Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was 
deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted. "196 
An examination of the Framers' primary concerns underlying their 
opposition to general warrants helps to inform this inquiry. The pro­
tections embodied in the Fourth Amendment were crafted, in large 
part, in response to the Framers' distasteful experience with writs of 
assistance, 197 a Colonial term for broad and vaguely worded general 
warrants authorizing, for example, the search of "suspected places."198 
These writs allowed government officials to search any private place at 
to general warrants and general searches alike rested upon broad concerns about protecting 
privacy, property, and liberty from unwarranted and unlimited intrusions."). 
194. See supra Section I.B (discussing the rule set out by a majority of the circuits that 
permits police officers to search locked common areas without a warrant). 
195. Davies, supra note 193, at 734. The second Justice Harlan expressed this view well: 
Even assuming ambiguity as to the intent of the Framers, it is common sense and not merely 
the blessing of the Framers that explains this Court's frequent reminders that: "The interpre­
tation of the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its 
provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the 
light of its history." 
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 123-24 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. 
Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888)); see also, Richard B. Saphire, Constitutional Theory in 
Perspective: A Response to Professor Van Alstyne, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1435, 1453 n.86 (1984) 
(noting that most jurists who dismiss the importance of the Framer's intentions retain "some 
conception of the framers' intent plays a role in [their] general approach to constitutional 
interpretation"); William A. Aniskovich, Note, In Defense of the Framers' Intent: Civic Vir­
tue, the Bill of Rights, and the Frame;-s' Science of Politics, 15 VA. L. REV. 1311, 1312, 1322 
(1989) (arguing that the Supreme Court's reliance on, and deference to, the Framers intent 
suggests that intent must play at least some role in interpreting the Bill of Rights). But see 
Davies, supra note 193, at 747 ("The reality of deep change since the framing means that the 
original meaning generally cannot directly speak to modern issues."). 
196. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132, 149 (1925)). 
197. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 5 1-78 (1937); see also Mark R. 
Killenbeck, Legal History: The Qualities of Completeness: More? or Less?, 97 MICH. L. 
REV. 1629, 1637 (1999) (reviewing THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, 
DEBATES, SOURCES, & ORIGINS {Neil H. Cogan ed. 1997)) ("The Court has stressed, for 
example, that ' [t)he writs of assistance . . .  were the principle grievaqce against which the 
fourth amendment was directed.' "). 
198. Davies, supra note 193, at 558, 561 (noting that "general warrants" also referred to 
warrants issued without sworn complaints or to those issued without an adequate showing of 
cause). 
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will,199 which often resulted in the "abhorred practice of breaking in, 
ransacking and searching homes and other buildings and seizing peo­
ple's personal belongings without warrants issued by magistrates."200 
Opponents vigorously protested these writs as illegal,201 and de­
nounced them as "the worst instance of arbitrary power, the most de­
structive of English liberty, that ever was found in an English law 
book,"202 because they placed "the liberty of every man in the hands of 
every petty officer."203 The colonists did not react well to this en­
croachment on their liberty, and protests, riots, and refusals to comply 
with the writs followed with regularity.204 The reaction against these 
writs of assistance was so strong, and the opposition to them so great, 
that the Framers found it necessary to outlaw them by direct constitu­
tional prohibition.205 
A constitutional ban on general warrants is not unique to the 
United States Constitution. Rather, the Fourth Amendment's prohibi­
tions, like most of the first eight amendments, were recasts of provi­
sions already existing within state constitutions.206 One such example 
was the Pennsylvania Constitution, whose search and seizure provision 
was itself a restatement of the common law, prudently inscribed in the 
supreme legal document of the state as "a solemn veto against this 
powerful engine of despotism. "207 The Framers acted similarly on the 
national level, entering a solemn veto against unreasonable searches 
and seizures in the United States Constitution.208 Their decision to 
place this veto in the Constitution is significant because the notion of a 
constitution is colored with systemic presumptions of permanence and 
continuity.209 
199. LASSON, supra note 197, at 53. 
200. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 367 (1967) (Black, J., concurring). 
201 . LASSON, supra note 197, at 58-59; see also Davies, supra note 193, at 588 ("[A] gen-
eral warrant was clearly deemed illegal by the framing era . . . .  "). 
202. LASSON, supra note 197, at 59 (quoting James Otis). 
203. Id. at 60. 
204. Id. at 65-77. 
205. See Davies, supra note 193, at 609-11, 613; Killenbeck, supra note 197, at 1637 
(quoting Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1988)). 
206. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 93 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Davies, 
supra note 193, at 693 ("The historical record of the framing of the Fourth Amendment 
shows that it was essentially a replay of the framing of the state provisions."). 
207. Davies, supra note 193, at 613: 
The whole [search and seizure provision] was nothing more than an affirmance of the com­
mon law, for general warrants have been decided to be illegal; but as the practice of issuing 
them had been ancient, the abuses great, and the decisions against them only of modem 
date . . .  it was thought prudent to enter a solemn veto against this powerful engine of des­
potism. (quoting Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. 315, 318 (Pa. 1814)). 
208. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
209. Davies, supra note 193, at 734. 
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The rule adopted by the majority of the circuits is inconsistent with 
this veto and flies in the face of one of the major concerns motivating 
the Framers to ban general warrants - the desire to protect the sanc­
tity of homes and secure them against government search.210 The pro­
hibition on search and seizure was an affirmation of the common 
law211 and must be viewed in light. of the special status accorded to the 
home at common law.212 The Supreme Court recognizes this fact213 and 
holds that privacy expectations are at their highest in those areas close 
to private homes.214 The lo�ked common areas of an apartment build­
ing are immediately adjacent to private homes and are unavailable to 
the general public. As such, tenants' privacy expectations within these 
areas merit recognition as legitimate interests that deserve a high level 
of constitutional protection.215 
It is important to note that the argument for recognizing constitu­
tionally protected privacy interests within locked common areas does 
not depend upon viewing common hallways as part of tenants' 
homes.216 Rather, it depends upon a consideration of the privacy inter­
ests the Framers sought to protect, viewed in the context of modem 
living conditions and in light of the privacy interests of tenants in those 
areas in close proximity to their homes. The Massachusetts' Court of 
Appeals considered the scope of a person's right to privacy and secu­
rity in those areas surrounding the home and concluded that there is 
no reason why those rights should not apply in the common hallways 
210. Id. at 601; Ooud, supra note 193, at 1726. 
211. See supra notes 206-207. 
212. See Davies, supra note 193, at 603 (stating that at common law the house had a 
unique status and was a sacrosanct interest tied to the entitlement to be left alone). 
213. In the oft-quoted words of William Pitt: 
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be 
frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may 
enter; but the King of England cannot enter - all his force dares not cross the threshold of 
the ruined tenement! 
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958) (quoting William Pitt, Earl of Chatham) 
(noting the importance of the home at common law). 
214. See, e.g. , Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 n.4 (1986) (declining 
to recognize a privacy interest in an industrial area in part because "this is not an area im­
mediately adjacent to a private home, where privacy expectations are most heightened"); 
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (noting that privacy expectations are most 
heightened in those areas intimately linked to the home). 
215. See, e.g., State v. Di Bartolo, 276 So. 2d 291, 294 (La. 1973) (recognizing a tenant's 
Fourth Amendment "right to reasonably expect privacy from government intrusion" within 
the hallways of his apartment building); Commonwealth v. Goldoff, 510 N.E.2d 277, 280 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1987). 
216. But cf. United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1985) (suggesting that 
tenants have no legitimate privacy interest in locked common areas of apartment buildings 
because the Supreme Court has not given the status of "home" to common areas). 
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of apartment buildings that tenants "have collectively secured from 
the general public by a locked door."217 
Indeed, it is difficult to come up with a good reason for depriving 
tenants of their privacy and security interests. Tenants in a multi-unit 
apartment building have an expectation of security and privacy from 
trespassers,218 and to contend otherwise is to ignore the reality of a 
locked door guarding the common areas. Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court has recognized apartments as "homes" for Fourth Amendment 
purposes,219 and the locked common areas of apartment buildings, re­
gardless of their quality or location, are not public thoroughfares.220 
They are, instead, private property reasonably secured against the en­
try of unauthorized individuals. The Framers would, no doubt, have 
been shocked at the suggestion that the Fourth Amendment permits 
police officers to trespass into the locked entryway of a private, single 
family house,221 and yet a majority of the circuits hold that similar po­
lice action loses all significance as soon as another family or tenant is 
217. In Go/doff, the issue before the court was whether an assault that occurred within 
the common hallway of the victim's apartment building took place within his "dwelling 
house." Go/doff, 510 N.E.2d at 278. In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that the pur­
pose of burglary statutes was "to prohibit that conduct which violates a person's right of se­
curity in a place universally associated with refuge and safety, the dwelling house." Id. at 
280. The court stated: 
When this historical [common law] right to security in one's place of habitation is considered 
in the context of contemporary multi-unit residential structures, we can think of no reason 
why that right should not apply to tenants who reach their apartment units by a common 
hallway which they have collectively secured from the general public by a Jocked door . . . .  
This reasoning applies with equal or greater force when the common areas of an apartment 
building (or condominium complex) are concerned. 
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). While the holding in Go/doff pertained to a 
state burglary statute, the court's reasoning as to a tenant's privacy and security interests 
within the locked common areas of an apartment building is strongly probative here. 
218. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 458 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
While this expectation is not absolute, it is still of significant value. See infra notes 233-238 
and accompanying text. 
219. See, e.g. , Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810-13 (1984) (considering the de­
fendant's apartment to be his home for purposes of the Fourth Amendment). 
220. Perkins v. United States, 432 F.2d 612, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazelon, J., dissenting) 
("The hallways of residential buildings, whether luxury highrises or humble rooming houses, 
are not public streets."). 
221. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 625 (1999) (describing protection of the home as 
the core of the Fourth Amendment); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 
297, 313 (1972) ("[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of 
the Fourth Amendment is directed."); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394 (1914) 
("[T]he Fourth Amendment was intended to secure the citizen in person and property 
against unlawful invasion of the sanctity of his home by officers of the law acting under leg­
islative or judicial sanction."); see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 143, § 3.2(c) (pointing out 
that "entry .of [a hallway in the interior of a single 
family dwelling] is a search"). 
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involved.222 The respect due the home and the area surrounding it de­
mands more protection than this. 
The rule adopted by the majority of the circuits is also at odds with 
another major factor motivating a constitutional ban on general war­
rants - the Framers' hostility to conferring discretionary search 
authority on common police officers.223 The Framers were concerned 
about the use of general warrants, especially as used and abused by 
customs officials.224 Consequently, they sought to interpose a neutral 
magistrate between the zealous police officer and the citizen to ensure 
that the citizen's privacy was disturbed only when the police officer's 
suspicions were supported by probable cause.225 They did so because 
"[t]he right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the dis­
cretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of 
criminals. Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police 
acting on their own cannot be trusted. "226 The Supreme Court recog­
nizes this fact and has been firm in maintaining that the Fourth 
Amendment is more than a mere formality and that the presence of a 
search warrant in the hands of the police serves an important pur­
pose.227 Nevertheless, the majority of circuits have dismissed this high 
function where locked apartment buildings are concerned and have 
vested warrantless officers with discretionary authority to search the 
locked common areas of apartment complexes at will.228 The Supreme 
Court should reject this narrow interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment and, in its place, adopt a construction that is consistent 
with the aims of the Framers and the history of the Amendment. 
IV. SOUND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE LOCKED COMMON AREA 
CONTEXT 
Extending the protections of the Fourth Amendment to cover the 
locked common areas of apartment buildings is also desirable as a 
matter of public policy. A broad interpretation is needed to protect 
tenants' legitimate privacy interests and is necessitated by a respect for 
222. See, e.g., United States v. Mccaster, 193 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 1999); United States 
v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1242 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 
1172 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255-56 (2d Cir. 1985). 
223. Davies, supra note 193, at 580, 583 (noting a "historical condemnation[] of officers 
exercising discretionary authority"). 
224. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 669-71 (1995) (O'Connor, 
J., dissenting) (discussing the Framer's concerns). 
225. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948) (discussing the motiva-
tions behind the Fourth Amendment). 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. See supra Section J.B. 
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the rule of law. Furthermore, broad protections provide a workable 
accommodation between the needs of law enforcement and the inter­
ests protected by the Fourth Amendment.229 Justice Harlan urged the 
Court not to "merely recite . . .  risks without examining the desirability 
of saddling them upon society . . .  without at least the protection of a 
warrant requirement."230 Taking this counsel into consideration, it is 
undesirable for government officers, governed by nothing but their 
own discretion, to enter locked common areas through trickery, tres­
pass, or other disingenuous means, to peer down hallways, peek under 
doors, and eavesdrop outside tenants' apartments. 
Extending the protections of the Fourth Amendment to the locked 
common areas of apartment buildings is needed to protect the legiti­
mate privacy interests of tenants in multi-unit apartment buildings. 
Many courts disagree with this assertion, however, finding the idea of 
a reasonable expectation of privacy within the common areas of a 
building to be counterintuitive.231 From this perspective, "[a]n expecta­
tion of privacy necessarily implies an expectation that one will be free 
of any intrusion, not merely unwarranted intrusions."232 As no single 
tenant has an absolute right to exclude others from the common areas, 
these courts see little reason for drawing artificial lines that only serve 
to keep police officers out. 
Courts should not, however, immediately dismiss tenants' privacy 
interests because they are not absolute.233 In fact, arguing that locked 
common areas, open to use by other tenants and their guests, offer no 
real shield. of privacy or protection ignores reality.234 The facts of the 
cases cited in this Note reveal that tenants do, in fact, rely on the pri­
vacy and security of locked common doors and, consequently, are apt 
to leave their doors ajar,235 to deposit various private items in desig-
229. It is also arguable that this construction of the Fourth Amendment is needed to 
ensure that both rich and poor are equally protected by the Amendment. Poor tenants, es­
pecially minorities, are much more likely to Jive in neighborhoods subject to close police 
scrutiny and are, therefore, more likely to feel the sting of unbridled police discretion. See 
David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped 
and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 678 (1994). 
230. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
231. See, e.g., United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[I]t is 
odd to think of an expectation of 'privacy' in the entrances to a building."). 
232. United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 1977). 
233. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 458 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
("[E]ach tenant of a building, while he has no right to exclude from the common hallways 
those who enter lawfully, does have a personal and constitutionally protected interest in the 
integrity and security of the entire building against unlawful breaking and entry."); see also 
supra notes 102-122 and accompanying text. 
234. See, e.g., Eisler, 567 F.2d at 816 ("The locks on the doors to the entrances of the 
apartment complex were to provide security to the occupants, not privacy in common hall­
ways."). 
235. See, e.g., United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 547-48 (6th Cir. 1976). 
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nated storage areas,236 or to leave items stored at the end of hallways 
or stairwells.237 Courts should recognize that many Americans do not 
live in single-family homes238 and should interpret the Constitution to 
protect these individuals' privacy interests against uninvited or unwar­
ranted intrusions. 
In addition to a concern for protecting tenants' legitimate expecta­
tions of privacy, a due respect for the rule of law demands that the 
Court recognize tenants' privacy interests within the locked common 
areas of their apartment buildings. Since the inception of this nation, 
Americans have taken pride in the fact that the American system of 
government embodies the rule of law, and not of men.239 This principle 
is jeopardized, however, when courts conclude that, in the interest of 
efficient law enforcement, police officers may violate the law to secure 
arrests and convictions.240 In fact, Justice Brandeis cautioned that the 
very existence of ordered government is endangered when the gov­
ernment fails to adhere faithfully to its own laws.241 He further warned 
that when "the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds con­
tempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it in­
vites anarchy."242 
For too long, courts have, in the name of safety and efficiency, 
permitted police officers to enter and search the locked common areas 
of apartment complexes without the protection of a warrant. They 
reason that permitting police to conduct discretionary searches of 
locked common areas strikes the optimal balance, for it gives tenants 
beneficial police protection within these areas, while at the same time 
preserving the privacy of their actual homes, that is, their apart-
236. See, e.g., United States v. Hawkins, 139 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 1998). 
237. See, e.g., United States v. McCaster, 193 F.3d 930, 932 (8th Cir. 1999). 
238. See, e.g., Judy Stark, Old Favorite, New Location, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 7, 
2002, at lF ("One-third of all Americans rent their housing, and 15 percent of all households 
Jive in apartments, the National Multi Housing Council says."). 
239. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 {1803) ("The government of the 
United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men."). 
240. See supra notes 54, 188 (noting that even courts that uphold warrantless searches of 
locked common areas acknowledge that the police officers' actions are illegal). 
241. In Justice Brandeis's words: 
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to 
the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, exis­
tence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe tile law scrupulously. Our 
Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole 
people by its example. 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
242. Id. ("To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the 
means - to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the convic­
tion of a private criminal - would bring terrible retribution."). 
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ments.243 It is indeed laudable that courts have stopped short of strip­
ping tenants of all their privacy interests, but this rationale alone can­
not be seen as a justification for stripping tenants of their privacy and 
security interests within the locked common areas of their apartment 
buildings.244 It is no answer to a constitutional complaint to respond 
that a particular government action results in greater police protection 
for society. Justice Douglas warned that this kind of compromise is 
detrimental to the privacy interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment and stated that a strict construction of the Fourth 
Amendment is needed to protect citizens from the onslaught of a 
government concerned predominately with efficiency and order.245 A 
meaningful application of the Fourth Amendment reveals that tenants 
do have an expectation of privacy that society should recognize as 
reasonable.246 The Supreme Court should heed Justice Douglas' 
warning and remain vigilant in jealously protecting citizens' Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
Finally, interpreting the Fourth Amendment to protect tenants' 
privacy interests is compatible with the Supreme Court's concern with 
providing "a workable accommodation between the needs of law en­
forcement and the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment."247 
Extending the scope of the Fourth Amendment to cover the locked 
common hallways of an apartment complex is not unduly restrictive 
because officers remain free to enter and search the locked common 
areas of apartment complexes with authorization from a tenant, land­
lord, or magistrate.248 Requiring police officers to obtain permission 
243. United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 1985). 
244. In any question of constitutional interpretation in light of countervailing social in­
terests, it is essential to remember that "grave threats to liberty often come in times of ur­
gency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure.'' Skinner v. Ry. Labor 
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
245. In Justice Douglas's words: 
[T]he concepts of privacy . . .  enshrined in the Fourth Amendment vanish completely when 
we slavishly allow an all-powerful government, proclaiming law and order, efficiency, and 
other benign purposes, to penetrate all the walls and doors which men need to shield them 
from the pressures of a turbulent life around them and give them the health and strength to 
carry on. That is why a 'strict construction' of the Fourth Amendment is necessary if every 
man's liberty and privacy are to be constitutionally honored. 
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
246. See, e.g., McDonald v United States, 335 U.S. 451, 458-59 (1948) (Jackson, J., con­
curring); United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 549-52 (6th Cir. 1976); see also supra Parts 
II, III. 
247. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984). 
248. Some assert that the warrant requirement serves little purpose because judges usu­
ally just rubber stamp search warrant applications. See, e.g. , David B. Kopel & Paul H. 
Blackman, The Unwarranted Warrant: The Waco Search Warrant and the Decline of the 
Fourth Amendment, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 1, 42 (1996) (internal citations omit-
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before passing through a locked door cannot be seen as any more un­
reasonable than the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment 
itself. Law enforcement needs are adequately served because police 
remain unaffected in "hot pursuit" cases249 and in other exigent cir­
cumstances. 250 
This rule is preferable to that adopted by a majority of the circuits 
because it lays down a clearly defined boundary line while at the same 
time protecting tenants' privacy interests. While other circuits boast 
that their rule is desirable because it is easy for officers to understand 
and apply,251 it is unclear why a more protective rule would not be just 
as easy for police officers to comprehend. In fact, the rule to the con­
trary is quite simple. If a door is locked, a police officer must obtain 
permission or a warrant before he or she goes inside. Any officer in 
the field can comprehend this rule,252 and its application would impede 
law enforcement efforts only where those efforts unreasonably inter­
fered with constitutionally protected interests. 
In short, society should not, as a matter of constitutional law and 
public policy, declare that tenants who choose to live in multi-unit 
apartment complexes, with the inherent loss of privacy that results 
from a mutual toleration of other tenants and their guests, conse­
quently forfeit all legitimate claims to privacy in these common areas. 
The protections of the Fourth Amendment are stronger than that,253 
and the Court ought not allow the constitutional protections that safe­
guard an individual's privacy and security to be overcome so easily.254 
ted). The Supreme Court, however, has pointed out that the presence of a search warrant in 
the hands of the police serves an important purpose. See McDonald v. United States, 335 
U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948). 
249. See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976). 
250. See, e.g., United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 533-34 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
police officers' entry into the locked common areas of an apartment building without a war­
rant, permission or exigency violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights). 
251. See, for example, United States v. Holland: 
This rule . . .  lays down a clearly-defined boundary line for constitutionally permissible po­
lice action, which is readily apparent to an officer in the field, without a need for counting 
apartments, analyzing common-hallway traffic patterns or interpreting the mental processes 
of a suspect relating to an area used in common with others. 
755 F.2d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 1985) (internal citations omitted). 
252 Cf. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment has 
drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold 
may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant."). If police officers can understand this 
rule, there is no reason why they cannot understand the rule advocated for in this Note. 
253. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) ("Wherever a man may be, he is 
entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures."). 
254. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Note examines the various approaches taken by circuit courts 
in determining whether a tenant has a constitutionally protected pri­
vacy interest within the locked common areas of an apartment build­
ing and demonstrates that the resolution of this issue by the majority 
of circuits is unsatisfactory. It argues that while states undoubtedly 
have a legitimate interest in preserving order and ensuring safety 
within the locked common areas of apartment buildings, courts should 
not permit the government to accomplish these objectives by running 
roughshod over the Fourth Amendment. 
This Note argues for a resolution of the deep circuit split in this 
area through the adoption of broad constitutional protections. It ar­
gues that Supreme Court precedent, the history of the Fourth 
Amendment, the intent of the Framers, and considerations of sound 
public policy all necessitate the recognition of a constitutionally pro­
tected privacy interest within the locked common areas of an apart­
ment building. Finally, this Note argues that the manner of resolution 
advocated herein is superior to the approach taken by the majority of 
the circuits because it lays down clearly defined boundary lines to 
guide police behavior, while at the same time protecting tenants' 
legitimate privacy interests. 
